Trust, Friends, and Investment in Late Victorian England by Taylor, James
1 
 
This article has been accepted for publication in a revised form in the Historical Journal. This 
version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-
sale or use in derivative works.  
 
Dr James Taylor, Lancaster University 
 
TRUST, FRIENDS, AND INVESTMENT IN LATE VICTORIAN ENGLAND 
 
One day in December 1887, the Reverend Dr James Caspar Clutterbuck called upon his friend and 
fellow resident of Bath, the Reverend Conolly McCausland, with a business proposition. The 
chancellor of the exchequer, George Goschen, was reforming local finances, which involved the 
creation of a local loans stock, backed by the state. Clutterbuck’s position as one of her majesty’s 
inspectors of workhouse schools under the local government board gave him privileged access to the 
investment, the terms of which were attractive. Paying 20 and 15 per cent in the first two years, the 
stock would revert to a rate of 8 per cent for a further thirteen years. Clutterbuck had invested in the 
loan himself, but was willing to share the opportunity with his fellow clergyman. A grateful 
McCausland immediately wrote Clutterbuck a cheque for £500.1  
Well-connected and well-known locally, Clutterbuck was the ideal person to enlist investors 
for Goschen’s new stock. As a workhouse schools’ inspector, he travelled extensively throughout the 
south-west and was therefore able to sign up dozens of subscribers from across the region. His 
largest investor was another clergyman friend, the Reverend Henry Horatio Pace, who placed a total 
of £5,650, but Clutterbuck also received sums from smaller investors, such as the school mistresses 
of the workhouse schools he inspected, several of whom entrusted him with savings of between £20 
 
1 Bristol Mercury, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3; Western Daily Press, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3; Bath Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1891, 
p. 2.  
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and £100.2 But by 1891 a reputation for extravagant expenditure was making Clutterbuck the subject 
of gossip at the local government board in London. Inquiries were made in Bath, and information 
was passed to the treasury.3 As a result, Clutterbuck was summonsed in October to appear before 
Bath magistrates charged with obtaining money by false pretences with intent to defraud. The star 
witness in this state-sponsored prosecution was Chancellor Goschen, dragged all the way from 
London in order to testify that he had never knowingly met Clutterbuck, and that the reverend’s story 
about a government loan was a complete fabrication.4  
Following five sessions before the Bath magistrates, the case was sent for trial at the crown 
court, Wells, before Justice Sir Lewis Cave. By now, Clutterbuck, aged 53, had achieved great 
notoriety: when he was led to the dock dressed in his clerical cloak and collar, he ‘was eagerly 
scanned by a crowded court’, and such was the rush to catch a glimpse of him that the public gallery 
‘distinctly swayed to and fro’ and looked like it was about to collapse.5 Clutterbuck tried to plead 
guilty to obtaining money by false pretences, but not with intent to defraud. Cave pointed out that he 
had to plead either guilty or not guilty to the charge as a whole, and after a brief consultation with his 
solicitor, ‘in a choking voice’, he pleaded guilty.6 In his summing up, Cave sympathised with 
Clutterbuck’s victims, arguing that the way in which the prisoner had systematically abused ‘the trust 
which they appeared to have reposed in him from the character which he held, as well as upon the 
friendship which existed between them and himself or members of their families’ made this ‘one of 
the very worst cases which in his experience had ever been brought into a court of justice’. He 
sentenced Clutterbuck to four years’ penal servitude.7 Bankruptcy proceedings subsequently showed 
 
2 Bath Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1891, p. 7; Western Morning News, 30 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
3 Bath Chronicle, 26 Nov. 1891, p. 7.  
4 Liverpool Mercury, 27 Oct. 1891, p. 5. 
5 Western Daily Press, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 7; Weston Mercury & Somersetshire Herald, 28 Nov. 1891, p. 7. 
6 Clifton Society, 26 Nov. 1891, p. 9.  
7 Bristol Mercury, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 3; Bath Chronicle, 26 Nov. 1891, p. 7. 
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that he had raised approximately £45,000 from at least thirty-seven clients over the course of just 
under four years.8  
The episode was utterly mystifying to contemporaries. How Clutterbuck had been able to 
fool so many of his friends with such an outrageous story was the question that ‘every journalist in 
England’ was asking, said the Spectator.9 The press’s preoccupation with the case suggests that the 
nature of trust and how it worked – and how it failed – were becoming urgent questions by the later 
nineteenth century. Sociological work suggests that with the growing complexity of modern 
societies, trust becomes at once more important and less certain: as Anthony Giddens puts it, ‘there 
would be no need to trust anyone whose activities were continually visible, or to trust any system 
whose workings were wholly known or understood.’10 The ‘thick’ forms of trust based on strong ties 
that characterize small, close-knit communities are less possible in larger societies with more 
attenuated relations, where ‘thinner’ forms of trust in weak ties or impersonal institutions become 
more common.11 Yet, it is clear that in such societies, both forms of trust in fact co-exist, the 
preference commonly shown ‘for transacting with individuals of known reputation’ suggesting the 
persistence of ‘thicker’ trust.12 Indeed, historians of economic relations in modern Britain reject the 
idea of a linear transition from old to new forms of trust. Margot Finn’s work on credit and debt, for 
example, seeks to complicate the notion that the nineteenth century saw ‘the triumph of anonymous 
consumer relations’, highlighting the rich moral economies that continued to structure the market.13 
 
8 Bath Chronicle, 25 Feb. 1892, p. 8. A list of investors was referred to in court but not read; references to it 
show that it included at least thirty-seven names: Daily News, 9 Nov. 1891, p. 7.  
9 Spectator, 28 Nov. 1891, pp. 755-6. 
10 Anthony Giddens, The consequences of modernity (Cambridge, 1996), p. 33.  
11 Bernard Williams, ‘Formal structures and social reality’, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: making and 
breaking cooperative relations (New York, 1988), pp. 3-13; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling alone: the collapse 
and revival of American community (New York, 2000); Dmitry Khodyakov, ‘Trust as a process: a three-
dimensional approach’, Sociology, 41 (2007), pp. 115-32. For the classic study of weak ties, see Mark 
Granovetter, ‘The strength of weak ties’, American Journal of Sociology, 78 (1973), 1360-80.  
12 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’, American Journal 
of Sociology, 91 (1985), pp. 481-510, at p. 490.  




Similarly, Aeron Hunt argues that Victorian business saw ‘impersonality and abstraction, 
personalization and embeddedness’ coexist in ways that defy easy categorization.14 Older forms of 
trust were not in opposition to the modern, argues James Vernon. Rather, they were ‘attempts to 
localize and personalize new abstract systems’, part of an ongoing ‘dialectic of abstraction and 
reembedding’.15 
These insights are particularly relevant when it comes to the market for stocks and shares. A 
host of factors were seemingly making investment less personal in the nineteenth century. The 
removal of the trade in stocks and shares from the coffeehouses of Exchange Alley to the London 
Stock Exchange, the rapid spread of the limited liability joint-stock company funded by hundreds or 
thousands of shareholders, the growth of national and international investment opportunities, and a 
mushrooming print culture made up of newspapers, circulars, and advice manuals, were just some of 
the forces untethering the market from face-to-face relations.16 Yet none of this diminished the 
importance of the human factor: indeed, it placed a greater premium on the personal as investors 
sought safety in local knowledge and individual assessments of character.17 Local markets for stocks 
and shares were strengthened with the formation of a number of provincial stock exchanges from the 
1830s.18 Company promoters wanted local shareholders as they were thought to be the most 
committed to an enterprise.19 Likewise, many shareholders saw investing locally as a way to 
overcome informational asymmetries and mitigate risk.20 And personal networks were particularly 
 
14 Aeron Hunt, Personal business: character and commerce in Victorian literature and culture 
(Charlottesville, VA, 2014), p. 14.  
15 James Vernon, Distant strangers: how Britain became modern (Berkeley, CA, 2014), p. 15. 
16 These have been explored in multiple works, including Ranald Michie, The London Stock Exchange: a 
history (Oxford, 2001); James Taylor, Creating capitalism: joint-stock enterprise in British politics and 
culture, 1800-1870 (Woodbridge, 2006); Paul Johnson, Making the market: Victorian origins of corporate 
capitalism (Cambridge, 2010).  
17 Hunt, Personal business, pp. 20-2. 
18 W. A. Thomas, The provincial stock exchanges (London, 1973). 
19 Lucy Newton, ‘Capital networks in the Sheffield region, 1850-1885’, in John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, 
eds., Industrial clusters and regional business networks in England, 1750-1970 (London, 2017), pp. 130-54, 
at p. 134. 
20 Janette Rutterford, Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, and Carry Van Lieshout, ‘Individual investors and local bias in 
the UK, 1870-1935’, Economic History Review, 70 (2017), pp. 1291-1320, at p. 1292.  
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important in facilitating women’s engagement with the market.21 So, despite its growing size and 
complexity, the financial market was not experienced as anonymous, but was rooted in everyday 
personal relations. 
Exploring the workings of, and interplay between, different forms of trust therefore becomes 
imperative. If investors still relied on face-to-face contacts for information and advice, how were 
these personal interactions shaped by the newer, impersonal features of the market, such as growing 
distance, abstraction, and print? Did old and new forms of trust reinforce or undercut each other?22 
Though these questions can be approached at the macro level, this article makes a case for 
investigating trust more subjectively. Detailed explorations of individual cases of investor behaviour 
are more typical for the eighteenth century than for the larger nineteenth-century market, and even 
these do not always probe the question of trust at length.23 Consequently, as Matthew Hollow has 
recently contended, we lack a clear sense of ‘how individual investors comprehended and made 
sense of this potentially confusing world of stocks and shares.’24 To address this shortfall, I argue 
that we can usefully borrow from historians of consumption who have highlighted ‘the need to 
particularize consuming experiences’ as the basis for exploring ‘the consuming imagination’.25 
Treating investment not solely as a matter of rational calculation but as a subjective, emotional, and 
 
21 Janette Rutterford and Josephine Maltby, ‘“The widow, the clergyman and the reckless”: women investors 
in England, 1830-1914’, Feminist Economics, 12 (2006), pp. 111-38, at pp. 124-5.  
22 Such questions have been explored in other contexts, including the markets for newspapers, patent 
medicines, and insurance: Victoria E. M. Gardner, The business of news in England: 1760-1820 (Houndmills, 
2015); Hannah Barker, ‘Medical advertising and trust in late Georgian England’, Urban History, 36 (2009), 
pp. 379-98; James Taylor, ‘Numbers, character, and trust in early Victorian Britain: the Independent West 
Middlesex Fire and Life Assurance Company fraud’, in Tom Crook and Glen O’Hara, eds., Statistics and the 
public sphere: numbers and the people in modern Britain, c.1800-2000 (London, 2011), pp. 185-202.  
23 Examples include Anne Laurence, ‘Lady Betty Hastings, her half-sisters and the South Sea Bubble: family 
fortunes and strategies’, Women’s History Review, 15 (2006), pp. 533-40; Koji Yamamoto, ‘Beyond rational 
vs. irrational bubbles: James Brydges the first Duke of Chandos during the South Sea Bubble’, in Le Crisi 
Finanziarie: Gestione, Implicazioni Sociali e Conseguenze Nell’età Preindustriale: Selezione di Ricerche 
(Florence, 2016), pp. 327-57.  
24 Matthew Hollow, ‘A nation of investors or a procession of fools? Reevaluating the behavior of Britain’s 
shareholding population through the prism of the interwar sharepushing crime wave’, Enterprise & Society, 
20 (2019), pp. 132-58, at p. 133. 
25 Sara Pennell, ‘Consumption and consumerism in early modern England’, Historical Journal, 42 (1999), pp. 
549-64, at p. 560. See also Helen Berry, ‘Polite consumption: shopping in eighteenth-century England’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 12 (2002), pp. 375-94, at 376-7. 
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ultimately imaginative process can enrich our understanding of trust in financial markets.26 The 
puzzling case of the Reverend James Clutterbuck and his credulous clients provides the raw material 
for this investigation into what we could call ‘the investing imagination’. Though we do not have 
access to the private papers of the participants, the court reports published in the press feature 
detailed evidence about six of his investors, as well as testimony from several other key actors. 
Alongside the copious accompanying editorials, and subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy, these 
permit a detailed reconstruction of the episode, which gives a vivid insight into how nineteenth-
century investors, particularly provincial investors who were not well connected, understood and 
experienced the financial market. 
Focusing on individual cases can be a compelling way of exploring the cultural practices 
shaping trusting relations in particular historical periods.27 By bringing into focus attitudes and 
behaviours that might otherwise be overlooked, such stories can, argues Joan Scott, ‘reveal 
complexities of human experience that challenge the categories with which we are accustomed to 
thinking about the world’.28 The article does this by unravelling three main strands of the case. The 
first section demonstrates how Clutterbuck mobilized appearances and reputation to win trust. In 
particular, it shows how he capitalized on pre-existing relationships with his victims, deliberately 
embedding financial transactions in the personal and the domestic. This was only part of 
Clutterbuck’s method, so the second section explores how the trust he cultivated also rested on the 
stories he told his investors. These stories gained both credibility and emotional resonance from their 
relationship to narratives circulating more widely in late nineteenth-century print culture. This 
enabled him to sign up risk-averse investors to what were incredibly high-risk investments. With the 
final section comes a twist which casts Clutterbuck’s behaviour in a different light, complicates our 
 
26 For an analysis of City fiction which makes a similar case, see Jakob Gaardbo Nielsen, ‘Poets of promotion: 
corporate personality and crowd psychology in Guy Thorne and Leo Custance’s Sharks (1904)’, Journal of 
Victorian Culture, forthcoming (online). 
27 Matt Houlbrook, Prince of tricksters: the incredible true story of Netley Lucas, gentleman crook (Chicago, 
IL, 2016), p. 4. 
28 Joan W. Scott, ‘Storytelling’, History & Theory, 50 (2011), pp. 203-9, at p. 207. 
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notions of victimhood, and brings wider aspects of the market for stocks and shares into view. The 
aim is to capture the complex interplay of friendship, emotions, and narrative in the formation of 




In the deluge of editorials that followed the prosecution, it was repeatedly argued that the case 
confirmed certain unfortunate but eternal truths about human nature. Clutterbuck’s victims fell for 
his stories because of their gullibility and greed. Though some acknowledged the precarity of those 
living on interest from investment, most discussions of Clutterbuck’s investors were decidedly 
uncharitable.29 Their ‘avarice blinds their commonsense, and renders them easy victims to the 
unscrupulous vagabond who offers them a preposterous return for their money’, explained the 
Bristol Mercury.30 Given longstanding habits of imagining women as naïve and credulous investors, 
some commentators thought it easier to understand how Clutterbuck managed to fool his female 
victims, though insisting that even they should have been able to consult ‘some competent male 
relative’.31 The men, on the other hand, should have had sufficient worldliness ‘to brush aside 
Clutterbuck’s romances like a cobweb’.32 Some observers sought an explanation in geography, 
arguing that the case revealed the extreme naivety of provincial people. The Daily News observed 
that the victims exhibited ‘the credulity of a herd of rustics at a country fair’, while Dundee’s 
Evening Telegraph was more scathing still, concluding that ‘moneyed simpletons with an unhealthy 
 
29 Pall Mall Gazette, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 1.  
30 Bristol Mercury, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 5. For similar sentiments, see Daily Telegraph, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 5; St 
James’s Gazette, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 4; Star, reprinted in Sunderland Daily Echo, 24 Nov. 1891, p. 4; Western 
Morning News, 24 Nov. 1891, p. 4; Shields Daily News, 24 Nov. 1891, p. 2.  
31 Bristol Mercury, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 5. For more on the perceived vulnerability of women investors, see 
George Robb, ‘Women and white-collar crime: debates on gender, fraud and the corporate economy in 
England and America, 1850-1930’, British Journal of Criminology, 46 (2006), pp. 1058-72. 
32 Times, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 9.  
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craving for an impossibly high rate of interest must be unusually plentiful in Somersetshire and 
round that way’.33 
Quick to emphasize how ignorant Clutterbuck’s victims had shown themselves to be about 
basic elements of finance – that chancellors did not need to borrow at such high rates of interest, and 
that they did not use schools inspectors as agents – press commentary rarely probed the origins and 
implications of this ignorance. One of the few newspapers to take the question seriously, The 
Speaker identified lack of provision for financial education as the root of the problem. It complained 
that the rudiments of business were rarely taught, and even popular primers on political economy, 
such as those by Henry and Millicent Garrett Fawcett, did not actually explain the practical 
dimension of business. This meant that ‘the mind of the average educated person is not a blank upon 
it; it is a kind of nebula’.34 Whereas the Speaker believed that education could combat this problem, 
the Spectator was perhaps more realistic in regarding such fields of ignorance as an inevitable 
feature of modern society, with its proliferation of specialized knowledge, where no one could be 
expert in all things. ‘The most intelligent among us are all profoundly ignorant upon some subject or 
another’ – if not money, then astronomy, geography, or medicine – and had no choice but to rely 
upon others. Whom people decided to trust thus became crucial, and the Spectator was clear about 
how such decisions were typically made:  
 
It is character which the majority trust, not statements which a large portion of them know 
they are incompetent to weigh. They think they know a good man from a bad man, and once 
satisfied that John Smith is good, they are capable of believing on his authority that sunbeams 
can be extracted from cucumbers.35 
 
33 Daily News, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 5; Evening Telegraph, 24 Nov. 1891, p. 2.  
34 Speaker, 28 Nov. 1891, p. 632. For more on the popular works on political economy by the Fawcetts, see 
Willie Henderson, ‘Millicent Garrett Fawcett’s Political economy for beginners: an evaluation’, Paedagogica 
Historica, 40 (2004), pp. 435-53. 
35 Spectator, 14 Nov. 1891, pp. 671-2. Sunbeams from cucumbers is a reference to Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s 




Reading character was therefore the foundation upon which trust was built, the means by which 
investors navigated the confusing and increasingly complex world of finance.  
There is much evidence that Clutterbuck’s victims found it reasonable to trust him because of 
their assessment of his character. He established his trustworthiness through what is best understood 
as a carefully orchestrated performance, mobilizing appearance, status, and what Matt Houlbrook has 
called the ‘material culture of confidence’.36 Indeed, Clutterbuck possessed a special combination of 
features to inspire confidence. An academic high-achiever, he had been a scholar of distinction at 
Durham University, eventually becoming a doctor of civil law in 1868. Prior to landing the role of 
schools inspector in 1874, he had been a schoolmaster, a curate of St Mary’s, West Brompton, and 
then assistant chaplain at Chelsea Hospital.37 As both a clergyman and a government official, it was 
easy for his victims to assume ‘that a person in his position was truthful and honourable’.38 He made 
the most of this, taking care always to be seen in his clerical coat, and his appearance was described 
as ‘that of a very mild and benevolent cleric’.39 He conducted his correspondence with his clients on 
the official notepaper of the local government board, Whitehall, which bore the government stamp as 
an authenticating seal. Receipts he gave his clients for sums deposited stipulated that in the event of 
Clutterbuck’s death, the holder should contact John Jordan, staff officer in charge of accounts at the 
local government board. These described Jordan as, variously, Clutterbuck’s executor, trustee, or 
legal representative, and gave the transactions a further official imprimatur.40 And Clutterbuck 
constantly reiterated his close relationship with Goschen, claiming that he had a ‘personal friendship 
 
36 Houlbrook, Prince of tricksters, p. 41.  
37 Bath Chronicle, 29 Oct. 1891, p. 3; Times, 19 Nov. 1892, p. 9. 
38 Western Daily Press, 23 Nov. 1891, p. 5. 
39 Illustrated London News, 28 Nov. 1891, p. 690. The Pall Mall Gazette also noted his ‘most benevolent 
countenance’: 23 Nov. 1891. For artists’ impressions, see Pall Mall Gazette, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 7; Devon and 
Exeter Gazette, 27 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
40 Western Daily Press, 9 Nov. 1891, 3.  
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of [an] intimate character’ with the Chancellor.41 By these means, he was able to invoke both church 
and state in support of his scheme.  
Moreover, rather than a remote figure, Clutterbuck was known personally or professionally 
by his victims, and he capitalized on these relations. Many were Bath residents, including fellow 
clergymen like McCausland and Pace, together with the headmaster of the government school of 
science and art in Bath, Charles Martin Hodges, medical inspector for the local government board, 
Dr Francis Henry Blaxall, and Jessie Caroline Turner, a widow. Hodges had known Clutterbuck for 
ten years, and was ‘on very friendly terms’ with him; Blaxall had moved to Bath more recently, but 
relations between the pair’s families had moved to ‘a very intimate footing’.42 Turner was not so 
close with Clutterbuck, but was very good friends with his wife. These were therefore people 
Clutterbuck saw informally on a social basis, which enabled him to broach the subject of money very 
casually, often in chance encounters, in a way that did not seem unusual. For example, Clutterbuck 
approached Turner as she was leaving the Bath branch of the Wilts and Dorset Bank, and struck up a 
conversation about her investments. As a result, Turner invited him to her house and they went 
through her portfolio together, and she agreed to sell out some of her existing investments in order to 
invest in the Goschen loan.43 Similarly, Clutterbuck first discussed the loan with Hodges in the 
course of a chance meeting in the streets of Bath. He began by inquiring about the school, of which 
he was a trustee, then shifted the conversation onto personal finances, asking whether Hodges ‘had 
any money put by which he should like to invest’.44 This resulted in an investment of £700, and 
Clutterbuck secured a second instalment from Hodges when the two met just as the reverend was 
leaving the Abbey church. In this way, Clutterbuck turned the streets of Bath into the innocuous 
stage for his performance.  
 
41 Bath Chronicle, 5 Nov. 1891, p. 2; see also Aberdeen Weekly Journal, 25 Nov. 1891, p. 4; Western Daily 
Press, 2 Nov. 1891, p. 8. 
42 Bristol Mercury, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
43 Daily News, 22 Oct. 1891, p. 2.  
44 Bath Chronicle, 5 Nov. 1891, p. 2.  
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Trust underpinned the expanding social circles that characterized middle-class urban society. 
A ‘new cult of friendship’ developed that allowed people to learn and practise ‘trustful relations’.45 
Friendship was understood as a reciprocal relationship, in which the idea of service was central. The 
giving and receiving of favours ‘were opportunities for displaying “acts of friendship” … and 
obliging the “friend” in further reciprocal exchanges’.46 Clutterbuck framed the investments in this 
way, as favours to friends. Rather than imploring them to invest, he presented the loan as a special 
opportunity restricted to a privileged few. For example, he told McCausland that he was allowing 
him to invest as ‘a friend and brother clergyman’.47 He also informed investors that the amount he 
was authorized to raise was strictly limited, so the right to place further sums with him was not 
guaranteed. This enabled him to present such permission, when granted, as an additional favour 
bestowed on an esteemed friend. When Blaxall asked if he could increase his investment, 
Clutterbuck wrote him a letter explaining that he would reduce his own share of the loan in order to 
enable his friend to place a further £600. ‘I need not say that there is no one to whom I would more 
willingly do a good turn than yourself, for though our knowledge of each other has not been of very 
long standing our friendship seems to me to date from long ago.’48 Thus, the personal and the 
financial were deliberately intermingled: presenting the transaction as a gift strengthened the feelings 
of reciprocity underpinning trusting relationships. The investments thus brought each party closer 
together, stimulating feelings of mutual gratitude, respect, and obligation.49 
Clutterbuck was also careful to embed the transactions in the context of family relations. 
Several times he presented the opportunity to invest as being in return for the thoughtfulness a friend 
had shown towards his family. He told Pace that he wanted to do him ‘a good turn’ because of ‘the 
 
45 Ute Frevert, The moral economy of trust: modern trajectories (London, 2014), pp. 21-2.  
46 Naomi Tadmor, Family and friends in eighteenth-century England: household, kinship, and patronage 
(Cambridge, 2001), p. 213.  
47 Western Daily Press, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
48 Western Daily Press, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
49 Margot C. Finn, The character of credit: personal debt in English culture, 1740-1914 (Cambridge, 2003), 
ch. 2.  
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extreme and sustained kindness’ Pace’s daughter had shown to his own; in a similar vein, he said 
that he was glad to be able to do something for Hodges ‘because he had always been so kind to his 
children’.50 Stressing his role as the caring father and the value he placed on a friend’s contribution 
to his family’s wellbeing underlined his moral credentials, while domesticating the transactions in 
this way further intensified the sense of reciprocity Clutterbuck was trying to encourage, increasing 
the intimacy of the bond and drawing the respective families closer together.51 That it deepened 
trusting relations is suggested by the fact that some friends gave Clutterbuck a great deal of 
autonomy over their financial affairs. Turner authorized him to make transactions on her behalf at 
her local bank, while Pace handed over several bonds and shares to Clutterbuck, trusting him to 
dispose of them on his behalf and reinvest the proceeds.52  
Clutterbuck also recruited investors from outside Bath: these were people he encountered in 
connection with his role as a workhouse schools inspector, including a dozen workhouse masters, 
and several school mistresses.53 Though these relationships were of a more professional order, and 
some were probably weaker ties, they included those with whom Clutterbuck had developed close 
and friendly relations, sometimes over the course of a very long period. William Pearce, master of 
Dorchester workhouse, had known Clutterbuck ever since the reverend began working for the local 
government board, and the two were on intimate terms. Clutterbuck’s transactions with Pearce were 
embedded in the same personal and family context as his Bath clients. When Pearce asked him if he 
could increase his investment in the loan in order to give his sons the best possible start in life, 
Clutterbuck replied that he was ‘disposed to stretch a point’ in his favour because Pearce’s ‘laudable 
ambition had his cordial sympathy’. When read in court, the letter, which concluded ‘with best 
wishes, ever your sincere friend, J. C. Clutterbuck’, provoked ‘loud hisses’ because of the abuse of 
 
50 Western Daily Press, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3; Bristol Mercury, 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
51 For Victorian middle-class men and family life, see John Tosh, A man’s place: masculinity and the middle-
class home in Victorian England (New Haven, 1999).  
52 Bristol Mercury, 2 Nov. 1891, p. 8; 7 Nov. 1891, p. 3.  
53 Pall Mall Gazette, 25 Nov. 1891, p. 6. 
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friendship it laid out so starkly.54 In this instance as in others Clutterbuck insisted upon secrecy – 
Pearce ‘must please remember that what he had told him was absolutely confidential, and must be 
strictly confined to himself and Mrs. Pearce’ – which helped to further bind the families together.55 
There is no evidence that Clutterbuck used his position to pressure any of his professional contacts to 
invest. Though it is of course possible that some felt such pressure, particularly perhaps the school 
mistresses who invested their small savings with him, no accusations along these lines were made in 
court or in the press. Indeed, Clutterbuck seems not to have been a rigorous schools inspector, with a 
reputation for being somewhat lax in checking the proficiency of the children, so was unlikely to 
have been seen as an intimidating presence by staff.56 It seems that the ties of friendship and amity 
were more influential here than those of obligation or deference. In his dealings with friends and 
professional contacts alike, trust was an emotional transaction, the financial element just part of a 




There was more to Clutterbuck’s success in inspiring trust than his performance and his 
manipulation of affective bonds, however. His story was just as important. Recent work in economic 
sociology has highlighted a basic but critical temporal point about investment: that it is shaped not 
only by past experience, but is also future-facing. Because the future is unknowable, any act of 
investment is a leap of faith, characterized above all by uncertainty. Consequently, economic 
behaviour is underpinned by what Jens Beckert calls ‘imagined futures’, and decision-making is 
 
54 Bath Chronicle, 5 Nov. 1891, p. 2; Times, 2 Nov. 1891, p. 12.  
55 Times, 2 Nov. 1891, p. 12. 
56 For evidence, see Cornishman, 29 Oct. 1891, p. 5; Evening News, 11 Feb. 1892, p. 2; Hampshire 
Advertiser, 24 Dec. 1892, p. 3. 
57 For more on this idea, see Frevert, Moral economy of trust.  
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‘anchored in fictions’.58 The stories people believe are therefore critical to understanding investment 
behaviour: their ‘fictional expectations take a narrative form, and become articulated as stories that 
tell how the future will look’.59 These stories provide the means of overcoming the anxieties and 
insecurities generated by the uncertainty of the future, giving people the confidence to act.60 
Fictional expectations are not formed individually but are ‘social phenomena’ circulated and shaped 
by ‘powerful actors such as firms, politicians, experts, and the media.’61 Sometimes these stories 
become ‘contagious’ and affect large numbers of investors, triggering booms and busts.62 Certainly 
the growth of the financial press in the nineteenth century began to make the mass circulation of 
influential narratives more possible. Stories also circulated at a more personal level, however, and 
less powerful actors were able to adopt and exploit narratives for their own ends. The Clutterbuck 
case shows us how emotionally-engaging stories could be used by such actors to cement trust and 
influence behaviour.  
Newspaper editorials recognized Clutterbuck as a storyteller, but accorded his stories low 
status. His frauds displayed ‘no particular cleverness’, his method ‘was simply one of audacious 
lying’.63 His tale about local loans was nothing more than a ‘cock-and-bull story’.64 The 
outlandishness of his narrative was contrasted with the rigorous realism of novelistic representations 
of the financial world.65 ‘Had any novelist invented a Clutterbuck to decorate his fiction, critics 
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would have said scathing things about the improbability of the man and his misdeeds’, wrote the 
Times.66 But this downplayed the skill with which Clutterbuck rendered his tall tale eminently 
plausible. He carefully crafted his story to resonate with his victims, the inventions woven 
seamlessly together with recognized facts and popular beliefs for maximum plausibility. Chancellor 
Goschen was indeed reorganizing local finance, a fact that had been widely reported, and choosing to 
make his fictitious investment a local loan allowed Clutterbuck to draw on this contextual 
knowledge.67 Thus, when Hodges’s brother asked for more information about the investment, 
Clutterbuck wrote to him that it ‘originated, as no doubt you have heard, in the desire to consolidate 
the enormous local indebtedness of the country by the creation of a stock called Local Loans’.68 That 
this was supposedly a government-backed loan also enabled Clutterbuck to present the investment as 
risk-free. Blaxall was told it was ‘as safe as the Bank of England’; in explaining its safety to Hodges, 
he alluded to the Barings crisis of 1890, stating that ‘Goschen is not the sort of man to dabble in 
Argentines’.69 Clutterbuck’s knowledge of his friends enabled him to inflect the tale in order to 
maximize its attractiveness to each one. So, he told headmaster Hodges that the loan was designed 
precisely for men like him ‘who, though Government servants, had no chance of superannuation’.70 
Other details were also varied: Pearce, for example, was informed that the investment was for home 
defence, while he told Pace that it was in government telegraphs.71 By assuring his friends that they 
were investing in government securities rather than, say, speculative foreign loans or mining 
ventures, Clutterbuck was able to capitalize on what one commentator called ‘the provincial 
prejudice against the Stock Exchange’, and made the proposition seem both familiar and safe.72 
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Clutterbuck exploited this prejudice in other ways. In telling his story, he emphasized that 
Goschen had elected to raise the loan privately through government officials in order to avoid the 
extortionate fees charged by the likes of Barings and Rothschilds.73 Though the interest paid was 
very high, ‘Rothschild would require much more than that to float such a loan’, and Goschen had 
‘refused to “salt Capel Court.”’74 Clutterbuck’s story thus chimed with the popular belief that 
governments were ‘always being robbed by great financiers, who “float” loans with fabulous profit 
to themselves’, as the Spectator put it.75 What might have appeared a suspiciously high interest rate 
could therefore be explained in terms of the huge savings made as a result of bypassing the City of 
London.76 It may have been a cock-and-bull story, but it was expertly told: as the Western Daily 
Press conceded, Clutterbuck’s friends would ‘not have been beguiled by a less clever rogue’.77 
Clutterbuck’s story was therefore plausible; it also had a compelling emotional resonance for 
provincial investors living far from metropolitan centres of finance. The financial journalism of this 
period promised to overcome this distance by providing its readers with the inside tips and 
confidential gossip that would help them beat the market.78 As Peter Knight argues, this form of 
journalism purported to provide a ‘resolution to the problem of asymmetric information’ that 
characterized the market by ‘making outsiders feel like they were insiders’.79 Key to accomplishing 
this was adopting an informal, first-person mode of address, and posing as the ‘staunch … guide, 
counsellor, and friend’ of readers.80 Clutterbuck emulated precisely this appeal, promising to level 
the playing field for his friends by sharing his inside information, acquired as a result of his 
government position. The secrecy that he invariably insisted upon was important not only in helping 
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him to avoid detection, but in reinforcing his investors’ sense of being favoured with privileged 
intelligence. As The Globe put it, ‘the idea of being admitted into an official secret for one’s private 
advantage is too delightful for the ordinary mind to withstand’. This explained why workhouse 
masters (‘who ought to be up to most forms of trickery’), and government officials (‘who are 
presumably men of the world’), could be taken in.81 Clutterbuck thus adapted the appeal of a certain 
brand of financial journalism, but what these newspapers were merely simulating – relaying 
confidential information to a friend – Clutterbuck could do far more authentically. For his victims, 
being told that they were being let in on a ‘good thing’ must have been far more seductive than 
reading financial gossip in a newspaper which, they might reflect, was available to thousands of 
others.82 And by this method, the bonds between Clutterbuck and his clients deepened: not just 
friends, they were now co-conspirators.  
Nevertheless, it is important to be specific about what Clutterbuck’s victims believed, and did 
not believe. Newspapers in the 1880s and 1890s were full of extravagant promises about the fortunes 
that could be made through speculation, and the advertising columns were particularly important 
here. Boldly addressed to ‘PERSONS WISHING TO MAKE MONEY’, advertisements in both the London 
and provincial press assured readers that ‘enormous profits are often made by gaining sound 
information’.83 These were placed by enterprising stock and share dealers operating outside of the 
official exchanges, and therefore not subject to the rules against advertising faced by members. 
Common to the sales pitch of many of them was the idea that they were modernizing antiquated City 
practices, using new technologies like the ticker tape and the telephone, and exploiting economies of 
scale, to offer better terms to members of the public, including reduced rates or even commission-
free dealing.84 Helping to manufacture a popular culture of speculation in late Victorian Britain, 
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these outside dealers and their outsized promises instigated something of a moral panic. Stigmatized 
as ‘bucket shops’, their offices were thought to be little better than common gambling dens, with 
customers betting recklessly on the rise and fall of share prices.85 Naïve provincial investors were 
believed to be particularly vulnerable to the temptations they offered.86 Yet there is no evidence that 
any of Clutterbuck’s investors were patrons of the bucket shop. Rather, they pulled their money from 
safe investments, or borrowed it in the case of Pearce, to deposit with Clutterbuck. Turner, for 
example, converted securities in two American railway companies, while Pace cashed in shares in 
the Army and Navy Cooperative Society.87 Nevertheless, the endless dissemination of get-rich-quick 
promises in the press, helped to create an environment in which great fortunes were easily 
imaginable. Despite their warnings about bucket shops, the press was also happy to tell stories about 
the money that could be won, like the Philadelphian tram conductor who was made redundant 
without a cent to his name and with a family to support, but, starting with a borrowed 10 dollars, 
invested so successfully with outside brokers that he eventually made $40,000.88 So when 
Clutterbuck promised his friends similarly wonderful returns, but with government-backed safety, it 
did not seem so farfetched. Indeed, there is the suggestion that Clutterbuck played upon the sense of 
envy generated by the late Victorian normalization of big profits. When persuading Hodges to invest, 
he pulled out a book and showed him a list of names with figures next to them, highlighting one 
name in particular and the large sums of interest this person had been earning quarterly. Hodges 
knew several of the names by reputation, and seeing their wealth effortlessly accumulating in the 
pages of Clutterbuck’s pocketbook seems to have helped him to contemplate investing himself.89  
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The case thus complicates how we understand investors, suggesting that it is not as 
straightforward as it seems to categorize them according to attitude to risk, with conservative 
investors prioritizing safety, and speculative ones willing to take a gamble. Bath was widely 
regarded as the home of the archetypally cautious investor – the ‘City of 3 per cents’ – and 
newspapers thought it incredible that Clutterbuck had managed to persuade its residents to subscribe 
to his ‘private and confidential “Goschens” at 10 per cent’.90 Yet he had not turned them into 
reckless plungers, despite the press’s eagerness to view the case as symptomatic of the ‘atmosphere 
of gambling’ that was now sadly prevalent in society.91 Rather, he was profiting from a wider 
climate in which ordinary investors’ ‘imagined futures’ could easily include big returns, earned 





So far we have focused on the trust that was placed in Clutterbuck, but we can also explore the trust 
Clutterbuck placed in others. His friends may have resisted the lure of the bucket shop brokers, but 
the same could not be said for Clutterbuck himself. The criminal investigation quickly uncovered 
why he had such a thirst for capital, given he enjoyed a relatively substantial salary of £600, plus 
£250 travel expenses.92 In September 1887, he had established a second household with a woman in 
Plymouth, and soon found his finances stretched.93 He faced the additional problem that, due to his 
modest salary when he married, he had made an arrangement with his mother-in-law whereby she 
vested most of her fortune in her daughter, on the understanding that, when he landed a better-paying 
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job, his salary would be paid into his wife’s account.94 Looking for ways to boost both his income 
and his financial autonomy, in December he came across the advertisements of Darnley Roland 
Darnley, one of the new generation of outside brokers, who was seeking capital to fund his business. 
Darnley promised Clutterbuck 20 per cent interest on any money he could lend him, plus 5 per cent 
commission. Not having any spare cash to invest himself, Clutterbuck approached McCausland with 
his story about Goschen’s loan. The £500 which McCausland entrusted to Clutterbuck went straight 
to Darnley.95 Though the reverend’s relationship with his Plymouth mistress ended soon after, he set 
up another establishment with a young woman named Ellen White in Exmouth the following year, so 
his need for money continued.96 Over the course of eighteen months, he funded Darnley’s brokerage 
to the tune of £7,040: as soon as he received money from one of his investors, he passed it on to the 
broker. Darnley regularly paid Clutterbuck interest on the loan, which the reverend used in order to 
pay interest to his investors. Borrowing money at a lower rate than he was lending it for seemed an 
infallible system for making money.97 
An even more lucrative opportunity presented itself in December 1888 when Clutterbuck 
came across another advertisement: ‘INCOMES INCREASED. – By dealings in Stocks and Shares by a 
private dealer, 50 per cent. guaranteed on investments, regularly paid during the past two years.’98 
The private dealer in question was Edwin Bliss, another outside broker, who assured Clutterbuck that 
clients who opened a discretionary account with him, allowing him to invest their money as he saw 
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fit, could in fact make profits of 100 per cent.99 Impressed, Clutterbuck began channelling funds to 
Bliss as well as Darnley. But the flaw in Clutterbuck’s schemes first suggested itself in the autumn of 
1889 when both brokers became insolvent, their speculations having failed. Facing massive losses, 
Clutterbuck doubled down. When Edward Morgan, a young mining engineer, took over Darnley’s 
old brokerage, Clutterbuck financed it to the tune of £8,000. He also placed £5,600 with Robert 
James Laidlaw, an accountant who was looking over Bliss’s affairs, and who sometimes dabbled in 
the markets on behalf of friends.100 When these yielded disappointing results, he even responded to a 
newspaper advertisement promising ‘an infallible system of winning money by backing horses on 
the turf’, stumping up £2,650, but receiving back only £90.101 
Thus, Clutterbuck both fooled and was fooled. ‘The same promises of extravagant interest 
which he had made to some persons, he allowed others to make to him,’ the Daily News observed.102 
Indeed, the Financial Times thought that Clutterbuck had shown himself even more credulous than 
his friends, being misled ‘by statements still more absurd and improbable even than his own.’103 
Darnley and Bliss convinced Clutterbuck that securing very large profits with very low risk was 
possible, to that extent that he did not believe that he was doing anything dangerous. When quizzed 
during bankruptcy proceedings about the brokers he speculated with, Clutterbuck demurred: ‘you 
can hardly call it speculated with … I deposited money at guaranteed interest.’104 He internalized 
their stories about low risk and high profits and regurgitated them, in amended form, to his victims. 
Naturally, Clutterbuck did not believe the stories he told his friends about Goschen’s loan, but he 
very much did believe that, through his outside brokers, he would be able to make the profits he 
promised them: this is why he attempted to plead not guilty to the intent to defraud.  
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Though Clutterbuck first encountered his brokers through print advertisements, the trust he 
came to place in them was cultivated through face-to-face relations, as it was with his own friends. 
He did not simply send Darnley a cheque on the strength of the initial advert; rather, he went to meet 
the broker at his City office, and was impressed by the sums he said he could make by speculation. 
Subsequently, he went to see Darnley often, preferring to hand over the money he was lending him, 
which was often in notes, in person.105 After he responded to Bliss’s advertisement, Bliss came to see 
him at the local government board to talk about the profits he could make for him. On the strength of 
this, Clutterbuck invested an exploratory £25, but soon increased his stake. As with Darnley, 
Clutterbuck met with Bliss when in London, usually at the Caledonian Hotel, near the Adelphi 
Theatre.106 The pair seem to have become close: when he was arrested, he was at Bliss’s Chelsea 
home with White, his mistress.107 The implicit trust Clutterbuck’s friends placed in him mirrored the 
unconditional trust he placed in his brokers. He did not ask Darnley for security for the loan, nor did 
he require details of exactly what he would do with the money, satisfied that Darnley would be able 
to make him the promised profits.108 Likewise, he trusted Bliss, and later Laidlaw, to speculate as 
they saw fit, giving them complete discretion in the choice of investments.109 His trust was such that 
his investments became deeply imbricated with his domestic arrangements: he encouraged White to 
invest with his brokers, and managed these investments on her behalf.110 He also persuaded his wife 
to invest; the losses she sustained meant that she and her daughters had to move in with her son, a 
young solicitor in London.111 
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The brokers spun Clutterbuck stories about the profits they could make, and any doubts 
Clutterbuck may have had about them were assuaged by the monthly interest they paid him. Backed 
by cash, their promises seemed all the more reliable. The brokers knew this: whenever Bliss’s 
speculations went badly, he paid Clutterbuck the interest regardless, hoping to make up the losses on 
the next account.112 Clutterbuck also understood the power of these payments to sustain trust: he paid 
his investors their interest regularly if they requested it, or gave them detailed statements showing 
their compound interest accumulating.113 When his losses mounted, he used part of the capital he 
was receiving from some of his friends to cover the interest payments due to other friends rather than 
risk breaking the spell.114 When Darnley went bust, he continued to pay his wife the interest on her 
investment, ‘fearing that the shock of the knowledge that the money had been lost would impair her 
health.’115 It is therefore ironic that he allowed himself to be taken in by the same method.  
More striking still is the durability of Clutterbuck’s trust. When Darnley announced that he 
had lost Clutterbuck’s entire capital, Clutterbuck stopped investing with him, but it did not sour 
relations between the pair, for when Darnley started out in business again in June 1890 with £1,000 
borrowed from the Reliance Insurance Company, Clutterbuck acted as one of the sureties for the 
loan.116 Remarkably, the bulk of the money he placed with Bliss – at least £15,000 – he invested 
after the broker’s insolvency in late 1889, based on Bliss’s insistence that he could make back the 
money he had lost.117 The money kept coming even after Bliss experienced further losses as a result 
of the Barings crisis the following year. Indeed, Clutterbuck continued trusting Bliss until the end: 
days before proceedings against him began, he went to Bliss with a further £1,000 for him, but Bliss, 
perhaps realizing that his own behaviour might shortly be scrutinized in court, told him ‘he did not 
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think it desirable to speculate with it’, and returned the money.118 Clutterbuck’s actions here may 
have been the final roll of the dice of the overcommitted gambler, but it was belief as much as 
desperation that drove him, for Clutterbuck’s trust survived even his trial and conviction. During 
bankruptcy proceedings, he attributed his insolvency not to the unreliable promises of the brokers, 
but to the criminal proceedings which had been instituted against him. Unrepentant, he maintained 
that he ‘had been guilty of nothing more culpable than a want of foresight and discretion’.119 He even 
boasted that he would eventually be able to pay off all his debts, plus interest, thanks to a sinking 
fund established by Morgan – the man who had taken over Darnley’s brokerage – and financed by 
his speculations, a plan which, unsurprisingly, came to nothing.120  
Viewing Clutterbuck as the middle link in a chain of deception reveals uncanny parallels in 
the strategies used for generating and maintaining trust throughout this chain. Originating in an 
unreliable story, nurtured by friendship, and sustained by the imagination, the trust Clutterbuck 
placed in his brokers looked remarkably similar to the trust he inspired in his investors. And just as 
he trusted till the end, so none of his friends chose to cash out of their ‘local loans’ till it was too 
late.121 Their trust cost them dear; for the brokers, on the other hand, there was no comeuppance, and 
they were even spared the ordeal of a cross-examination in the criminal trial due to Clutterbuck’s 
guilty plea.122 Clutterbuck himself paid a heavy price, however. Still bullish in the court of 
bankruptcy, his spirits faded as his prison sentence wore on. By August 1892, his health had 
deteriorated, and he was given lighter labour to perform. But by November, his constitution had 
completely given way, and he was admitted to the prison infirmary. Though offered ‘fish, fowl, 
jellies and champagne’, he refused to eat, and stopped speaking to anyone, including the doctor. The 
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stories had run out. He died on 18 November, nearly a year to the day after his trial, as a result of 
heart failure. The press suggested that he died of ‘a broken heart’.123 Alternatively, we could 




The growing complexity of the financial markets in the later nineteenth century left many investors 
feeling bewildered. Newspapers, circulars, and manuals promised to demystify investment but often 
confused more than they clarified. As Sir Henry Burdett, editor of the London Stock Exchange’s 
Official Intelligence, admitted in the 1890s, it was useless for those with ‘no head for figures’ to try 
to make sense of the market data he so assiduously compiled every year, and that ‘for practical 
purposes an investor must depend largely upon his broker when selecting his investments.’124 Indeed, 
stockbrokers, together with bankers and solicitors who also advised on investments, were the human 
‘access points’ of an increasingly abstract and deterritorialized stock market, playing a critical role in 
facilitating participation.125 Though they could appeal to a growing sense of professional expertise 
by the later nineteenth century, these formal intermediaries could also seem remote and 
unapproachable figures, especially to small investors.126 Moreover, scandals involving bad behaviour 
by such intermediaries always attracted significant press attention, which underlined the precarity of 
dealing with a stranger.127 The Clutterbuck case demonstrates how readily investors could be 
persuaded to trust someone in their immediate social circle, and how robust such trust was. As a 
consequence, understanding everyday financial behaviour involves taking into account not only the 
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activities of formal market intermediaries like stockbrokers, but also informal, self-appointed ones 
like Clutterbuck. The argument is not that trusting a friend would always end in catastrophe, but that 
when it did, such disasters shine a light on Victorian investors’ willingness to privilege affective 
bonds when it came to the stock market. Friendship and finance were tightly interwoven.  
Abuses of this kind of trust, as in the case of Clutterbuck, were regarded as shocking, and in 
the process of ‘sense-making’ that followed such episodes, press commentators sought to fashion 
narratives explaining what had gone wrong and how to prevent a repetition.128 But the results should 
not be taken at face value. By presenting the episode as a morality tale, complete with an absurd 
villain and idiotic victims, the press obscured its significance. Such obfuscation performed important 
cultural work, rendering the whole episode more comprehensible and less disturbing. Commentators 
were attempting to shore up the differences between safe investment and risky speculation, real 
security and fantastic fraud – most fundamentally, between fact and fiction – upon which the market 
depended. These differences had to be seen as obvious for confidence in the market to be 
maintained. Such interpretations flattered and reassured readers: able to recognize Clutterbuck’s 
story as nonsense, they were unlikely to fall for such a swindle themselves. Unpicking these tales 
allows us instead to highlight the power of the plausible man – or woman – to disrupt these 
categories.129 Clutterbuck spun his story in an atmosphere already thick with narratives. 
Advertisements, prospectuses, journalists, brokers, not to mention novelists and playwrights, all 
circulated competing stories about the market, yet hindsight alone provided certain means of 
distinguishing the trustworthy from the unreliable. Despite attempts to defuse their troubling 
 
128 For a useful discussion of this process, see Per Hansen, ‘Making sense of financial crisis and scandal: a 
Danish bank failure in the first era of finance capitalism’, Enterprise & Society, 13 (2012), pp. 672-706. 
129 Houlbrook, Prince of tricksters, pp. 19-20. Though women’s ability to act as formal market intermediaries 
was limited in these years, there was far more scope for them to perform this role informally, deploying the 
same repertoire of strategies available to men. For a colourful example, see the case of Marie Josephine 
Leslie: Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 8.0, 19 Nov. 2020), July 1907, trial 
of LESLIE, Marie Josephine (39) (t19070722-52). 
27 
 
implications, cases like Clutterbuck’s drew attention to finance’s inherent fictionality, suggesting 
that when investors ventured into the market, all they had were stories. 
